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MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY: COMMUNITY
COMMUNICATIONS CO. v. CITY
OF BOULDER
Congress enacted the Sherman Act' to preserve free and unfettered
competition in interstate and foreign commerce.2 States, however,
retain power to regulate the commercial affairs of their citizens.3 The
1 The applicable sections of the Sherman Act, for purposes of this article, are
sections one and two. They have remained unchanged since their promulgation in
1890 Section one of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal ... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section two provides: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor .... " Id § 2.
The Supreme Court has clearly rejected a literal reading of the Sherman Act in
examining restraints of trade. The Court has interpreted the statute to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 63-66, at 165-82 (1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). The Supreme Court, viewing the Sherman Act a
"character of freedom," has broadly interpreted the Act. In Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court stated that the Sherman Act was designed
to be a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty... . It rests on the premise that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resouces, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preserva-
tion of our democratic political and social institutions." Id at 4-5. See also, City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406 (1978) ("In enacting the
Sherman Act. . . Congress mandated competition as the polestar by which all must
be guided in ordering their business affairs."); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular,
are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.").
3. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). The Supreme Court in Parker said
that the Sherman Act "makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it
was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by the state." Id at
350. See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961) (upholding
state statute requiring a business permit); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods.,
306 U.S. 346 (1939) (upholding state statute regulating milk prices); Cooley v. Board
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"state action"4 doctrine protects that power by exempting from fed-
eral antitrust liability states engaged in anticompetitive conduct. A
series of recent Supreme Court decisions5 has attempted to develop
criteria for applying the state action doctrine.' Those cases, however,
did not clearly delineate the contours of state action immunity as ap-
plied to municipalities.' The Supreme Court, in Community Commu-
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (upholding state statute requiring ships to
hire local pilots). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978);
Lucas, Constitutional Law and Economic Liberty, 11 J.L. & ECON. 5 (1968).
Historically, states have had authority to formulate regulation for the health, safety,
and general welfare of their citizens, restricted only by constitutional and statutory
provisions. The basic rationale for exempting state action from the Sherman Act is a
concern for the impact of conflicting policy on federalism interests. See generally
Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.J. 950, 951 (1970).
4. The "state action" doctrine, which the Supreme Court announced in Parker,
provides that federal antitrust laws do not apply to action deriving from and directed
by a state's sovereign power.
5. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (immunity granted to an-
ticompetitive activity because of high degree of state supervision); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co. 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (immunity denied because anticompetitive action not
initiated or compelled by state); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)
(threshold factor in determining state action is whether the state was acting as
sovereign).
6. Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates state different approaches the Court has taken to
define the scope of state action immunity. In Goldfarb, the Court applied a "thresh-
old inquiry" to determine whether the state required the activity. In Cantor, the
Court examined whether the state approved the anticompetitive action. In Bates, the
Court attempted to determine whether the state authorized the regulatory statute.
The Court applied yet another test in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978). Then the Court stated that the state legislature must
have contemplated the regulatory action. The Court expanded the City of Lafayette
test in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Co., 445 U.S. 97
(1980). The Midcal Court stated that "the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as State policy;' [and] the policy must be 'ac-
tively supervised' by the state itself." Id at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)),
7. Although the Supreme Court had not yet examined the application of the state
action doctrine to municipalities, lower courts had done so. See, e.g., Whitworth v.
Perkins, 559 F.2d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 1977), vacatedsub nom. City of Impact v. Whit-
worth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978) (need more thorough analysis before applying state action
doctrine to municipality instead of state); Duke v. County of Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277
(3d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, The Antitrust Liability of Municifoalities under the
Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. Rnv. 368 (1977); Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Cor-
porations: Are Municipalities Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage under the Parker
Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547 (1977).
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nications Co. v. City of Boulder,8  demonstrated the limited
availability of the state action doctrine for municipalities,9 holding
that federal antitrust laws apply to municipal regulatory action unless
there is active state supervision or a clearly articulated and aflirma-
tively expressed state policy requiring the action. 10
Community Communications Company (CCC) sued the City of
Boulder, seeking a preliminary injunction." The company alleged
8. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). In 1966, Community Communications Company (CCC)
was granted a revocable, non-exclusive permit to conduct a cable television business
within the city limits of Boulder. Although CCC was licensed to provide cable service
to the entire city, it was impractical at that time for the company to provide service
outside the University Hill area, where only 20% of the city's population lived. Id at
837. Prior to 1975, CCC provided transmission only from television stations in the
Boulder area. During the late 1970's, satellite technology spurred a growth in the
cable television industry, establishing access to remote stations via satellite. Id
Technological improvements in the late 1970's enabled CCC to offer many more
channels of entertainment and offer its service to residents in other areas of the city
where, for geographical reasons, the residents previously could not receive the televi-
sion signals. Id
In 1979, CCC sought to expand its cable television service to other areas of the city
as a result of the improved technology. Due to the new technology, however, other
potential competitors sought to provide service to Boulder. In July of 1979, Boulder
Communications Company (BCC) requested a permit to provide a competing cable
television service in the city. Id In response to the request, the mayor and city coun-
cil members met with a consultant to review and reconsider the city's cable television
regulations in light of new changes in the industry. Id The council enacted two
emergency ordinances, which restricted expansion by CCC for a period of three
months. Id During the three months the council drafted a model ordinance that
gave control to the city over the eventual cable television operator. Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 710 (10th Cir. 1980) (Markey, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
9. For purposes of this Comment, "municipality" includes municipal corpora-
tions, cities and townships. Counties are sometimes considered as municipalities. For
a discussion of the state action doctrine and its application to municipalities, see gen-
erally 16E J. VON KALINOWSKY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATIONS § 46.03 (1978); Donnem, supra note 3; Jacobs, State Regulation
and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 25 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 221, 231-57 (1975); Page,
Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique ofthe
State Action Exemption after Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099 (1981).
10. 102 S. Ct. 835, 841 (1982). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, feared that munici-
palities would be held liable under the Sherman Act and this opinion unless they
could point to an affirmative expression of state policy. "Surely the Court does not
seek to require a municipality to justify every ordinance it enacts in terms of pro-
competitive effects. If municipalities are permitted only to enact ordinances that are
consistent with the pro-competitive policies of the Sherman Act, a municipality's
power to regulate the economy would be all but destroyed." Id at 849 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
11. 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D. Colo.), rep'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), CCC
1983]
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that two ordinances,12 which restricted CCC from expanding its cable
television service, violated Section One of the Sherman Act.'I Boul-
der argued that enacting the restrictive ordinances was within its po-
lice power as a "home rule" municipality.14 The city asserted that its
constitutionally derived "home rule" authority accorded it the same
immunity to antitrust laws that the state possessed under the "state
action" doctrine. 5
The district court rejected the city's argument, holding the state
action doctrine inapplicable. The court granted the injunction.' 6
also brought suit against Boulder Communications Company (BCC), alleging that
BCC and the city conspired to restrict competition by substituting BCC for CCC. Id
The district court noted that although there was some evidence that might point to a
conspiracy, the evidence was "insufficient to establish a probability that petitioner
would prevail on this claim." Id
12. 485 F. Supp. at 1037. The first ordinance, amending the original ordinance,
imposed a 90-day moratorium on CCC's cable expansion in Boulder. City of Boul-
der, Colo. ordinance 4473 (Dec. 19, 1979). The second ordinance revoked the original
ordinance and reenacted it to include the moratorium. Boulder, Colo. Ordinance
4472 (Dec. 19, 1979). The Boulder Council determined that this action was necessary
to prevent CCC from obtaining a competitive advantage by connecting up new cus-
tomers while negotiations with other cable companies were beginning. The council
expressed fears that CCC might not be the best operator for Boulder, but would be
the only operator because of its head start in the area. Id
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See supra note 1. CCC contended that these ordinances
violated the Act because they prevented CCC from expanding its business and thus
restricted trade. 485 F. Supp. at 1038.
14. The Colorado Home Rule Amendment, COLO. CONST., art. XX, § 6, grants
municipalities having populations of 2,000 or more the right of self-government in
local matters. The amendment states that ordinances enacted by home rule munici-
palities supersede conflicting state laws.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 838. Home rule charters grant municipalities the power to tax or
serve the public without seeking specific state legislation first. Commentators have
generally agreed that a requirement of state contemplation of local government action
prior to granting state action immunity may be unworkable. See 1 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 57, 58 (1978 Supp. 1982); Vanlandingham, Municipal
Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 280 (1968); Note,
Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt from Sherman
Act Coverage under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1559 n.7 (1977).
16. 485 F. Supp. at 1039. The district court noted that the case might have been
decided differently if the city had enacted the moratorium with other regulations as
might have been necessary or proper in the exercise of police power. Id
The district court further determined that the city, in drafting the model ordinance,
had "submitted it to the cable television industry with a request that those who
wished to make proposals to enter the Boulder market should give their comments on
that draft." Id at 1038. The court concluded that immunity was not proper because
of the excessive involvement by private parties in the drafting of the modern ordi-
nance. Id at 1039.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed, 7 finding the city immune from antitrust
liability under the state action doctrine' 8 because Boulder had no
proprietary interest.'9  The Supreme Court reversed 20 the court of
17. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). The Tenth Circuit
court reversed, concluding that the regulation of cable television was within the city's
authonty over local matters. Chief Judge Seth, writing for the majority, concluded
that the city was exempt under the state action doctrine because Boulder had com-
plete authority over local matters. 630 F.2d at 706-07. The court found that Boulder
had a clearly articulated policy to foster competition, which the city actively super-
vised by enacting a moratorium on construction by CCC and drafting a model ordi-
nance. Thus, Boulder satisfied the state action immunity test and was immune from
antitrust hability. Id at 707-08.
18. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
19. When a municipality performs acts of a private proprietary nature, such as
corporate and commercial activities generally performed by private enterprise, a mu-
nicipality acts autonomously. When a municipality provides service in its public or
governmental capacity, it is considered "an agency of the state for conducting the
affairs of government." I E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 2.09 at 146-
47 (rev. 3d ed. 1977). The various tests for classifying whether a particular activity is
proprietary or governmental have created confusion and conflict. Among the criteria
for making the determination are "whether the activity is primarily for the advantage
of the state as a whole or for the special local benefit of the community involved, and
whether the activity is of a business nature which is generally engaged in by private
persons or corporations." Id
In Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982) the
Tenth Circuit discussed the difference between proprietary and governmental activi-
ties by affirming a trial court's finding of municipal immunity. Pueblo Aircraft
charged antitrust violations arising from the city's operation of the municipal airport.
Pueblo contended that the city was operating the airport in a proprietary capacity
because it owned, maintained and operated the airport. Thus, Pueblo argued, the city
was not immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine. The court of
appeals stated that in cases where ownership, maintenance and operation of a munici-
pal airport have been found to be a proprietary instead of governmental function,
state authorization has been absent. Id at 810. The court found that a state statute
authorizing the city to acquire and operate the municipal airport provided a sufficient
declaration of public purpose to confer state action exemption. Id at 808. See, e.g.,
Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972) (statute
authorizing anticompetitive marketing program held to advance purpose); Rocky
Mountain Motor Co. v. Airport Transit Co., 235 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1951) (ordinance
establishing municipal airport held to be a proprietary action).
Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 51 U.S.L.W.
4195 (U S. Feb. 23, 1983) (No. 81-827) (The sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with private pharmacies is
not exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act under the state action doctrine. Such an
exemption is not supported by the Act's terms nor by the purposes of the antitrust
laws.)
In cases where a municipality functions in an essentially commercial manner, the
policy for immunizing the conduct does not exist. See Note, The Antitrust Liability of
Municipaities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REV. 368, 386 (1977). Cf. Note,
19831
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appeals, concluding that the "home rule" provision in the state con-
stitution did not satisfy the requirement of a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy.2 A majority of five justices22
held that the state action doctrine did not exempt a "home rule" city
from federal antitrust liability.23
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act to permit
states to engage in anticompetitive conduct when the conduct is not
an undue burden on interstate commerce or otherwise in violation of
the Constitution.24 In a leading case, Parker v. Brown,2S the Court
held that states are immune from federal antitrust liability when act-
Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations. Are Municpalities Exempt from Sherman
Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547, 1583-85 (1977) (suggests
abolishing the governmental/proprietary distinction). The difficulty, however, in
many cases is that the municipality is involved in business activities that also serve
regulatory or governmental purposes.
20. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
21. Id at 842-43. The city argued that in local matters, the Colorado General
Assembly has no authority to act in a home rule city. The Boulder Court responded
that if each home rule municipality were able to establish a different antitrust policy,
the clear articulation and affirmative expression test would no longer be viable. In
Glenwillow Landfill v. City of Akron, 485 F. Supp. 671, 678 (N.D. Ohio 1979), afd
sub nom. Hybuel Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), va-
cated, 50 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1982), the Ohio district court stated that the
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy need not reflect a uni-
form state policy. Rather, the court must look at the "clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed" intent on the part of the state. The Supreme Court in Boulder
rejected this rationale.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 844. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. He was joined
by Justices Powell, Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens.
23. Id Citing from its opinion in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), the Court emphasized that the ruling did not preclude mu-
nicipalities from providing services on a monopolistic basis if they have clear state
authority. 102 S. Ct. at 844.
24. See, e.g., Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. The concepts of federalism, preemption
and limits on federal power are involved in the constitutional aspect of the antitrust-
state action conflict. The tenth amendment allows states to regulate locally "save only
as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority." Id See also United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("Tenth Amendment was enacted to allay
fears. . . that states may not be able to exercise their fully reserved powers"); Com-
ment, Municipal Antitrust Liability, 18 URBAN L. ANN. 265, 269 n.22 (1980).
25. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See generally Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker
v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1 (1976); Posner, The Proper Rela.
tionshp Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. Ruv.
693 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action." A Formulafor Narrowing Parker
v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 71 (1974); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process andAnti.
trust: Rflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975).
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ing pursuant to state policy.26 In Parker, the Supreme Court found
that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to restrain the an-
ticompetitive activities of a state and its officers.27 The Court admit-
ted that California's anticompetitive marketing program would
constitute an illegal restraint of commerce if instituted by private citi-
zens.28 Nevertheless, the California scheme was outside the scope of
the federal antitrust laws because the program derived its authority
from the state and did not operate or become effective without state
authority 29
The Parker Court noted that a state may use its power to immu-
nize private parties from antitrust scrutiny only if these parties re-
ceive specific direction from the state.3" A state cannot grant
immunity, however, to violators of the antitrust laws merely by au-
thorizing the violations.3' The Court further limited the scope of state
action immunity when it stated that neither a state nor its municipal-
ity is exempt from federal antitrust liability in instances of conspiracy
26. 317 U.S. at 352-68. Parker involved a Sherman Act challenge to California
legislation that restricted competition among raisin growers in order to stabilize
prices. The legislation grew out of a petition by private growers to the California
Agricultural Advisory Commission, requesting specific production quotas. After the
commission and 65% of the growers in the area approved the petition, it became law.
Id at 344-51. The Court upheld the statute on commerce clause grounds, reasoning
that the state program applied only to intrastate business. Additionally, the Court
found that in the absence of preemptive federal statutes, states have the authority to
supervise local concerns. Id at 360-61, 368. See also Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited.-
The Slate Action Doctrine after Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898,
898 n.3 (1977).
27. 317 U.S. at 350-51. "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or
in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislatures." Id.
28. Id at 350.
29. Id
30. The state created and enforced the private raisin program in execution of a
governmental policy. Id at 352.
31. 317 U.S. at 351. The first elucidation of the later Parker doctrine, which
stated that a state cannot grant immunity to violators of antitrust laws by authorizing
the violation, was in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)
(agreement between two railroad companies to form a joint holding company vio-
lated the Sherman Act even though the state allowed the chartering of the holding
company). For a discussion of Northern Securities and other cases prior to Parker,
see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE REGULATION AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS: CONFLICTING ROLES FOR ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1975). See also
Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1951) (Louisiana
law enforcing private price-fixing agreement declared invalid).
1983]
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to restrain trade.32
Parker firmly established the state action immunity doctrine.33
The Supreme Court, however, failed to provide criteria that ade-
quately defined the limitations placed on state action immunity.3 4
The lower courts, therefore, have applied the doctrine
inconsistently. 35
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,36 the Supreme Court began to
define the scope of the Parker state action doctrine. The Goldfarb
Court found that the minimum fee schedules of a local bar associa-
tion, which the state bar association enforced, constituted price fixing
in violation of federal antitrust laws.37 Citing Parker, the Court
stated that the threshold standard in determining state action for
Sherman Act purposes is whether the state, acting as sovereign, re-
quires the activity.38 The Court found no indication that either Vir-
ginia's Supreme Court or legislature required the establishment of a
minimum fee.39 The Goldfarb Court therefore concluded that, absent
compelling state action, the state bar association's use of a minimum
32. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
33. Although Parker is historically recognized as establishing the state action im-
munity doctrine, the doctrine actually had its origin in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332,
344-45 (1904). For further discussion on the state action doctrine before Parker, see
Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUNI.
L. REv. 1 (1976).
34. Following Parker, the Supreme Court continuously denied judicial review in
state action immunity cases. See, e.g., Lamb Enter., Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461
F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444
F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
35. Compare New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.
1974) (state and its political subdivisions automatically immune from antitrust liabil-
ity when involved in prohibited antitrust conduct) with Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc.,
444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (antitrust violative
action taken by public official not automatically protected from antitrust liability),
36. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
37. Id at 781-83. A Virginia statute established the authority of the Virginia
Supreme Court to create and enforce the state bar rules. The pertinent parts of the
Virginia statute provide as follows: "The Supreme Court may. . prescribe, adopt,
promulgate and amend rules and regulations organizing and governing the associa-
tion known as the Virginia state bar. . . to act as an administrative agency of the
Court for the purpose of investigating and reporting the violation of such rules and
regulation. . . ." VA. CODE § 54-49 (1982).




fee schedule was not exempt from the Sherman Act.4°
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,41 the Supreme Court denied state
action immunity for a public utility's distribution of "free" light
bulbs to encourage use of electricity.42 Despite the utility's argument
that the program was part of the tariff that the Michigan Public Serv-
ice Commission required, the Cantor Court found no clear indication
that the commission considered the anticompetitive implications of
the program. The Court, therefore, concluded that the commission's
neutral position would not support a claim of state action immu-
nity.43 Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion. He outlined two
circumstances in which private parties would not be liable for their
anticompetitive conduct: 1) when the state compelled the private
party to obey the state sovereign, and 2) when Congress intentionally
avoided interfering with conduct the state already regulated.' The
utility failed the first part of the test because it initiated the anticom-
petitive conduct many years before the state began regulation.45 The
utility failed the second part of the test because the state had no inter-
est in regulating the light bulb program that federal antitrust laws
would thwart.4 6 On these facts, Justice Stevens found Detroit Edison
liable for its anticompetitive conduct under federal antitrust laws.4 7
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,41 lawyers challenged the state
bar's regulation of lawyers' advertising. The Court held the discipli-
nary rule of the Arizona Bar exempt from antitrust challenge.49 In
40. Id at 791. The Third Circuit applied the Goldfarb compulsion standard in
Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975). Because of the absence
of statutory compulsion, the court held that Pittsburgh municipal corporations vio-
lated the antitrust laws by refusing to sell the plaintiffs' malt beverages in certain
municipal facilities. Id
41. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
42. Id at 598. The plurality in Cantor found that the anticompetitive conduct of
the public utility was not immune under the state action doctrine, because the case
presented no question regarding the legality of any acts of the state, its officers or
agents. Id at 591-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. Id at 584-85.
44. Id at 592.
45. Id at 594.
46. Id at 595-98.
47. Id at 598.
48. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
49. Id at 359-63. The Supreme Court distinguished Cantor as involving claims
against a private party, while Bates involved a claim against the Arizona Supreme
Court as the real party in interest. The Bates Court also noted that in Cantor the
1983]
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finding the state action immunity doctrine applicable, the Court fo-
cused on the inclusion of the disciplinary rule in the official rules of
the Arizona Supreme Court. This finding enabled the Court to con-
clude that the disciplinary rule was a clear articulation of state policy,
which the Arizona Supreme Court actively supervised."
After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bales, the extent to which the state ac-
tion doctrine applied to municipalities remained unclear.5 The
Supreme Court, therefore, discussed the limits of state action immu-
nity with respect to municipalities in Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co..52 The Lafayette Court specifically addressed the question
of whether municipalities, involved in a conspiracy to restrain trade,
are exempt from antitrust liability. 3 A sharply divided Supreme
Court concluded that municipal regulatory conduct is not always im-
mune from antitrust liability.54 The plurality opinion55 noted that
State of Michigan had no regulatory interest in the market for light bulbs. The State
of Arizona, on the other hand, had a well-established interest in the regulation of
lawyer advertising. Id at 360-62. In distinguishing Goldfarb, the Court noted that
the Virginia Supreme Court rules did not require the use of minimum fee schedules,
whereas the Arizona Supreme Court rules clearly prohibited legal advertising. Id at
359-60.
50. Id at 359-63. For further insight into the impact of Cantor, Goldfarb and
Bates on the state action doctrine, see generally Note, Parker v. Brown flevisited The
State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 898
(1977).
51. See supra note 7.
52. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The Court emphasized clear state authorization. Justice
Marshall, concurring with the plurality, stated that the state must impose anticompe-
titive practices "as an act of government state action involving more anticompetitive
restraint than necessary to effectuate governmental purposes must be viewed as incon-
sistent with the plurality's approach." Id at 418.
53. Id at 389-92. Two municipally-owned power companies sued a privately-
owned competitor for antitrust violations. Louisiana Power & Light Co. counter-
claimed, alleging that the city illegally attempted to delay the construction of its nu-
clear power plant in violation of federal antitrust laws. The Louisiana laws allows
cities to own and operate public utilities. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1326, :4162,
:4163 (West 1950).
54. 435 U.S. at 394.
55. Id at 415. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens joined in the plu-
rality opinion.
Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Stewart's dissent, which stated that munici-
palities should be exempt from liability under the Sherman Act. He would have re-
served decision on the one case, however, where a municipality conspired with private
parties. Justice Blackmun expressed an unwillingness to impose possible antitrust
liability on the unilateral actions of governmental subdivisions. The explanation for
his change of position is that, in Boulder, CCC alleged a conspiracy between the city
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the state action doctrine exempts anticompetitive activity conducted
by a sovereign state or by its subdivisions pursuant to state authoriza-
tion.56 Thus, the Lafayette Court concluded that a municipality,
claiming exemption under Parker, must show that the state legisla-
ture mandated its activities with an intent to displace57 the applicable
antitrust laws.
Two years later, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. ,58 the Court attempted to define more pre-
cisely the degree of state participation necessary for finding state ac-
and a competitor to eliminate it from the market. Justice Blackmun had previously
indicated that conspiracy situations should not be exempt. For further discussion, see
Hoskins, The "Boulder Revolution"in MunicipalAntitrust Law, 70 ILL. B.J. 684 (1982).
56. 435 U.S. at 415. Other cases illustrate that certain conduct can be beyond the
reach of antitrust laws if the challenged restriction is a clear articulation and affirma-
tive expression of state policy and activity supervised by the state. See, e.g., New
Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (California statute
requiring state approval of the location of car dealership franchises exempt due to
ongoing regulatory supervision by the state); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977) (see supra note 37 and accompanying text); Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona
Downs, 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.) (date allocation between operators sharing the same
racetrack held immune to antitrust laws after a finding of active state supervision),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2308 (1982).
In cases where there is neither clear articulation of state policy nor active state
supervision, however, there is no immunity. See, e.g., California Liquor Dealers v.
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976); City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982) (rate
program not adequately supervised by state to be immune from antitrust laws); City
of Mishawka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980) (rate reduc-
tions ordered by state agency held insufficient to immunize city from antitrust laws),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.) (adoption by local government of defendant's
swimming pool specifications held inadequate to exempt promotion of specifications
by defendant to restrict trade), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
57. 435 U.S. at 413, 415. A state may displace competition through anticompeti-
tive legislation in two ways. First, the state may either adopt mandatory regulation to
be directed by an agency or select permissive regulation authorizing private coopera-
tive agreements. Second, mandatory regulation may be used to remedy a situation in
which competition would not yield a stable, efficient equilibrium. See, e.g., New Mo-
tor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 100-03 (1978) (statutory plan al-
lowing existing car dealers to delay establishment of new franchises within relevant
market area by filing timely protest); Parker, 317 U.S. at 346-47 (raisin growers al-
lowed to petition for establishment of prorate marketing plans and serve on governing
program commission). Permissive regulation may attempt to remedy instances in
which antitrust principles unduly restrict business relationships. See R. POSNER & F.
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 1009-
10 (2d ed. 1981). For a general discussion on the two theories, see Page, supra note 9.
58. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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tion. 9 Midcal Aluminum alleged that the enforcement of a
California statute, which authorized wine distillers to set wine resale
prices, violated the Sherman Act.6 0 The Supreme Court struck down
the statute after determining that the action did not satisfy the pre-
requisites for immunity under Parker6 and Lafayette.62 Those pre-
requisites are 1) a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy, and 2) active state supervision of the anticompetitive ac-
tion.63 The wine pricing system satisfied the first requirement,6" but
failed the second.65 The state's failure to actively monitor the market
conditions and to establish and review prices convinced the Midcal
Court that enforcement of the Sherman Act would not frustrate state
sovereignty.66
In City of Boulder, the majority applied the principle previously
adopted in Lafayette and Mideal: municipal anticompetitive conduct
must clearly articulate or affirmatively express state policy to gain
antitrust immunity.67 The Boulder Court found that the constitu-
tional "home rule" guarantee of local automomy was not a clearly
59. Id Courts have refrained from applying the compelling state participation
solely on the basis of language. In Midcal, the Court defined compulsion as a combi-
nation of supervision and articulated state policy, emphasizing supervision, but not
command. 445 U.S. at 104-05. Areeda, supra note 7.
60. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier and rectifier
shall:
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers...
(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale prices, if he
owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or consumers.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1982).
61. The first part of the test derives from language in Parker. There, the Court
stated that the Sherman Act was not intended to restrain a state or its officers from
activities directed by its legislature. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
62. The second part of the test was enunciated in Lafayette. The Supreme Court
concluded that the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct that is
made pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulations or monopoly
public services. 435 U.S. at 413.
63. 445 U.S. at 105-06.
64. Id The Court noted that the clear articulation and affirmative expression re-
quirement of the state action test was met when California authorized and enforced
the price setting. Id
65. Id The Midcal Court found that the wine-pricing system failed the active
state supervision requirement, because the state neither established the prices nor re-
viewed the reasonableness of the price schedules. Id
66. Id
67. 102 S. Ct. 835, 842-43 (1982). For a discussion of Lafayette, see supra note 55
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articulated and affirmatively expressed manifestation of state policy
that contemplated Boulder's enactment of an anticompetitive regula-
tory program. 68 Rather, the majority viewed the state's position as
neutral.69 The Court also rejected7" Boulder's contention that the
Home Rule Amendment delegated powers permitting municipalities
to act as the state in purely local matters. The majority recognized
that principles of federalism which recognize both national and state
governments support the state action exemption. Federalism does
not extend to sovereign cities.72
Three justices dissented,73 arguing that the issue in Parker was
whether federal antitrust laws preempt local statutes and ordinances,
not whether local governments are exempt from antitrust laws.74 The
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Midcal, see supra notes 58-65 and accom-
panying text.
68. 102 S. Ct. at 843.
69. Id
70. Id at 842.
71. Id The principle of federalism is derived from the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which provides:
This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Id Thus, state law that is inconsistent with federal law will be preempted. See gener-
ally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-23 to 6-27, at 376-91 (1978);
Note, The Preemption Doctrine.- Shifting Perspective on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975); Note, AFrameworkfor Preemption Analysis, 88
YALE LJ. 363 (1978).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 842-43. Case law gives municipalities a constitutional basis for
claiming immunity from antitrust liability. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), the Court concluded that a federal minimum wage law unconstitu-
tionally interfered with the sovereign police power of the states. The Court held that
Congress may not regulate state and local government functions absent a national
emergency. At least one commentator has argued, therefore, that statutory interfer-
ence with local and state functions render antitrust regulations inapplicable. See gen-
erally Comment, At Federalism's Crossroad- National League of Cities v. Usery, 57
B.U.L. REV. 178 (1977).
73 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, dis-
sented. 102 S. Ct. at 846.
74. Id at 845. Justice Rehnquist's dissent concentrated on a single legislative is-
sue-that whether the regulatory action is preempted by confficting federal legisla-
tion. In distinguishing between preemption and exemption, Rehnquist noted that
preemption involves conffict between federal and state laws, while exemption ad-
dresses whether Congress intended an enactment to relieve a party from complying
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dissenters also rejected the majority's implication that municipalities
may be liable for violation of the Sherman Act unless their actions
further or implement an affirmatively expressed state policy.'- On
the other hand, Justice Stevens, concurring, maintained that the ma-
jority did not hold that Boulder had violated federal antitrust laws,
but merely that the antitrust laws apply even though Boulder has
home rule status.76
The holding in Boulder clarified the expression of state policy crite-
rion previously adopted in Lafayette and Midcal: blanket authoriza-
tions in state constitutional home rule provisions are not sufficiently
explicit to satisfy the requirement of an expressed state policy.7 7 The
majority opinion suggests that governmental subdivisions should
evaluate their ordinances and official conduct in light of their anti-
trust significance. 78 Unfortunately, few state legislators consider po-
tential antitrust lawsuits when formulating statutes.79 Although the
Supreme Court has stated previously that express authorization is not
required, Lafayette, Midcal and Boulder convey the unmistakable
message that municipal actions are immune from antitrust liability
only when the municipality can show that the legislature contem-
with a prior enactment. Id at 845-46. Since the state action issues commonly involve
state and local regulation that conflict with the Sherman Act, Rehnquist maintained
that a preemption analysis should be utilized. Id at 846. Justice Rehnquist observed
that the decision in Parker, Midcal and New Motor Vehicle Bd demonstrate the pre-
emption rationale. Id at 846-47. Rehnquist viewed these decisions as establishing
that local governmental legislation, which restricts competition, is not preempted so
long as there is sufficient state supervision. Id at 847-48.
75. Id. at 849. "If municipalities are permitted only to enact ordinances that are
consistent with the pro-competitive policies of the Sherman Act, a municipality's
power to regulate the economy would be all but destroyed." Id (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id at 844. Justice Stevens noted, "the violation issue is separate and distinct
from the exemption issue." Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Because the state action doctrine lacks specific criteria with respect to munici-
palities, the Supreme Court's decision in Lafayette has been applied with varying
results. See, e.g., Hybuel Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981)
(traditional role of local government in providing sanitary service contemplated by
legislature); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568, 586 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) ("legislative enactments here clearly contemplate" the challenged activity);
Highfield Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 488 F. Supp. 1176, 1190 (D. Md. 1980)
(state regulatory law contemplates state monopoly of public water service).
78. 102 S. Ct. at 844.
79. Id at 843. A possible reason is that municipalities have traditionally been
regarded as arms of the state and thus are presumed to be exempt from antitrust laws.
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plated the kind of action undertaken.8" This broad construction al-
lows the lower courts to infer whether a challenged anticompetitive
conduct is a necessary or reasonable consequence of state authorized
activity.8
Although the Boulder Court has dispelled some uncertainty re-
garding the extent to which state action immunity applies to munici-
palities, the Court has left several issues unsettled. For example, the
Court neglected to provide a framework for determining the clarity
with which the state must authorize an anticompetitive regulation
and display its intention to displace the antitrust laws.82 Moreover,
the Court does not indicate whether the "active state supervision"
80. Id at 842.
81. See, eg, In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568, 586
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (despite lack of statutory authority, general grant of power to air-
ports found to contemplate the regulatory action); Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (despite absence of express statute concerning prison stores or mo-
nopolies. immunity granted on basis of the importance of state prison regulation). Cf
Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (immunity
denied to city granting monopoly to a taxi company). See generally Areeda, Antitrust
Immunity'for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REv. 435, 445 (1981).
82. After Boulder, it remains unclear whether the treble damage remedy will ap-
ply to state municipalities and subdivisions. The Boulder majority stressed that "We
do not confront the issue of remedies appropriate against municipal officials." 102 S.
Ct. at 843 n.20. The eleventh amendment protects states from retroactive monetary
relief in private suits based on federal causes of action, but does not forbid equitable
or prospective relief. See, e.g., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (equitable cause
of action lies against state officers in their individual capacities, notwithstanding the
eleventh amendment). Municipalities, therefore, are not completely protected by the
eleventh amendment. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Markham
v. City of Chicago, 176 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
If the Supreme Court finds that the treble damages provision of the federal anti-
trust laws applies to municipalities, the Court will have to consider the applicability
of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and its tenth amendment
concerns. The Court's holding in National League of Cities limits Congressional
power to interfere with essential state and local government functions. The Court was
also concerned that federal interference would make the cost of delivering essential
government service prohibitively high, resulting in a displacement of such services.
The imposition of punitive damages may not increase the cost of essential services,
but it would certainly interfere with the municipalities' ability to deliver traditional
services. Thus, if treble damages were so great that they strained municipal resources,
and adversely affected delivery and structure of traditional governmental functions,
municipalities would raise a National League of Cities defense. See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); Note, The Application of Antitrust
Laws to MunicipalActivities, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 544-49, 546 n.202 (1979); Note,
Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violation, 89 HARV. L.
REV 922 (1976).
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criterion of Midcal applies to local governments in conjunction with
the requirement of expressed state policy.8 3 Finally, the Court fails
to define clearly the governmental entities that represent the state and
require state authorization before acting. 4
Despite those uncertainties, the Supreme Court's decision in Boul-
der has clarified the position of the Lafayette plurality.85 Boulder
clearly states that a general authorization of governmental powers
will not satisfy the standard for state action immunity.86 Rather,
state action immunity requires a clear demonstration of legislative
intent.
Sadie R. Copeland
83. 102 S. Ct. at 841 n.14. Lower courts have inferred that the active supervision
requirement applies to municipalities. See Hybuel Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron,
654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981) (agency of state found to supervise adequately munici-
pal solid waste plant); Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
§ 64.029 (D. Colo. 1981) (adequate supervision maintained when municipal zoning
authority was found to have adequate supervision through a mandated board of ad-
justment). Cf. Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981) (supervisory require-
ment found unsatisfactory).
84. For a general discussion of the problems involved in determining whether the
local governmental unit represents the state or whether the regulatory conduct by the
unit requires authorization, see generally Areeda, supra note 8 1, at 444.
85. For a discussion on the Lafayette plurality opinion, see supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 843. The Boulder Court noted that acquiescence in the proposi-
tion that a general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state au-
thorization, "would wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation and
affirmative expression' that our precedents require." Id
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